Abstract
Introduction
On 12 October 2011, hundreds of Maya demonstrators led by several social organizations, marched through Guatemala's capital, using the formerly called "Día de la Raza" (Columbus Day) to demand an end to forced land evictions and to natural resource exploitation in indigenous territories. The struggle of Guatemala's Maya population for social and political justice forms part of a region-wide wave of indigenous mobilization that has resulted in far-reaching political gains for these historically marginalized groups (Lucero 2008; Madrid 2012; Stavenhagen 1992; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005 ).
Due to the 36-year civil war characterized by genocidal state violence, this indigenous mobilization emerged later in Guatemala than in other countries. 1 Only with the political opening of the early 1990s, the opportunity structures for social movements (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004 ) turned favorable , and an array of Maya organizations (re-)emerged, exerting strong political protagonism during the peace process (Azpuru 1999; Hale 2006; Jonas 2000; Warren 1998 ). Nevertheless, the country's underlying power structures have remained unaltered, and the stark ethnic inequalities persist. 2 At the same time, the political weight of these organizations has diminished considerably in the last decade (Bastos and Brett 2010a; Hale 2006) . Hence, the question arises: To what extent have movement-internal weaknesses halted the struggle for indigenous rights in Guatemala?
According to theories of collective action (Olson 1965) , large, diverse social groups face more difficulties in organizing politically than small ones. In the context of indigenous political mobilization, then, one could argue that large indigenous groups may produce more, and more heterogeneous, actors involved in collective action processes, which should complicate coordination. Indeed, in the case of Guatemala, scholars have 3 associated Maya political fragmentation in part with the high social heterogeneity that characterizes the group (Smith 1990a; Warren 1998) . However, the same diversity of indigenous actors can be found in other countries, most notably Bolivia and Ecuador where, under comparable ethno-demographic conditions, two of the most powerful indigenous movements have emerged. 3 As Lucero (2008) shows, strong collective indigenous voices were constructed in these countries despite considerable regional, linguistic, religious, and ideological divisions. Hence, the crucial empirical question is why in some instances disparate indigenous actors are able to construct powerful collective voices, whereas in others (including present-day Guatemala) they remain disarticulated. To provide solid answers to this question, we need to analyze, for specific cases, the precise causal mechanisms leading to either outcome.
This study argues that national-level Maya mobilization in Guatemala is crippled by a weakness of what O'Donnell (1986) has called "horizontal voice": the ability to construct a collective political identity and agenda, making the emergence of a strong vertical voice possible. Drawing on dozens of interviews with leaders of Maya organizations, members of the ladino political elite, and outside experts, carried out during a 3-months field research in the country, the study identifies both movement-internal and external barriers to horizontal voice, which distinguish the Guatemalan case from more successful cases of indigenous mobilization in the region.
The next section elaborates the theoretical argument. After a brief description of the historical context and the study's research design, the empirical analysis shows, first, how organizational sectorization, the lack of elite consensus on key substantive issues, and unclear alliance strategies compromise the effectiveness of horizontal voice among Maya organizations. Yet, as subsequently emphasized, these problems are also exacer- Stavenhagen 1992; Wade 2010) . Although the discriminating electoral laws of the past have given way to a formal system of universal political rights, the extremely unequal distribution of economic and social resources systematically disadvantages these groups in the political arena, even in countries where they compose a demographic majority (Enloe 1978; Madrid 2005 Madrid , 2012 . Since the 1970s, however, indigenous (and to a lesser extent African-descendant) groups have embarked on a sustained process of collective mobilization, making powerful claims for either autonomous control over their own territories or for equal participation at the level of the central state (Lucero 2008; Madrid 2012; Sieder 2002; Van Cott 2000; Yashar 2005 ).
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To explain the emergence of indigenous movements scholars have often followed a structuralist approach based on the classical literature on political opportunity structures and social movement strength (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004) . They have emphasized the importance of favorable structural and political-institutional conditions (Birnir 2004; Van Cott 2003 Yashar 2005) , the availability of trans-ethnic alliances with white or 5 mestizo sectors of society and their organizations (Madrid 2012; Rappaport 2005) , the increased access of indigenous elites to higher education and transnational communication networks which have sharpened group consciousness (Stavenhagen 1992; Wade 2010, 114) , and international legal regimes such as the ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples or the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sawyer and Gomez 2012) . As Brysk (1996) has pointed out, indigenous groups can often draw upon the support of inter-and nongovernmental organizations that defend their interests vis-à-vis state governments based on these internationally codified group rights.
The political pressures created by these movements have yielded tangible political benefits to Latin America's indigenous groups, in terms of collective rights (Becker 2011, 57-9, 142-6; Sieder 2002; Van Cott 2000) , access to land and (bilingual) education (Madrid 2012, 176; Pallares 2007; Van Cott 2000; Yashar 2005 ), recognition of indigenous languages (Becker 2011, 146-9; Van Cott 2000) , and control of local spaces of political power (Lucero 2008; Madrid 2012, 176-7; Ospina, Santillana, and Arboleda 2008; Van Cott 2001) . As scholars have pointed out, strong and autonomous pressure groups are indispensable for the protection of the interests of underprivileged sectors of society (Edwards 2004, 80-2; Rueschemeyer 2004, 86-7) . In the words of Jenkins (1995) , social movements can assume the role of representing the underrepresented and thereby countering entrenched oligarchies.
Indigenous movements in Latin America have often used tactics of contestation and protest to advance their interests vis-à-vis state governments. Yet, they have also relied on strategies of targeted lobbying vis-à-vis state institutions, both in Guatemala (Azpuru 1999; Hale 2006; Jonas 2000) , and elsewhere in the region (Becker 2011; Rousseau 2011; Van Cott 2000 , 2001 (Becker 2011; Lucero 2008; Lucero and García 2007) . 5 Additionally, according to Hale (2004 Hale ( , 2006 , regimes of neoliberal multiculturalism have divided the movements by distinguishing between "good" (i.e. compliant) and "bad" indigenous leaders, and co-opting the former into the state structures.
Certainly, "access" -i.e. political influence -is difficult to achieve without a strong voice. Indigenous people in Ecuador, for example, were able to form a powerful movement that combined the demands of different ethnic groups (including mestizos) and, thus, became a very influential political actor in the country (Becker 2011; Gerlach 2003; Selverston-Scher 2001) . Importantly, Lucero (2008) shows that indigenous movements can achieve great political power despite internal divisions as long as strong, representative collective voices exist. These voices are both a political and a cultural product as the very identity of the group needs to be constructed before meaningful political claims can be made (Lucero 2008; Lucero and García 2007; Vermeersch 2006) . Hence, besides the external opportunity structures, movement-internal processes and strategies of constructing a political identity and collective voice must also be regarded as determining factors for successful mobilization (cp. Vermeersch 2006, 41) .
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Guillermo O'Donnell (1986) has referred to these processes as "horizontal voice", which he distinguishes from "vertical voice" that is directed to the rulers. 6 Specifically concerned with the collective action of social groups in repressive regimes, O'Donnell describes horizontal voice as the mechanism through which individuals form a collective political identity and determine the common "ideal and/or material interests, the pursuit of which supposedly will guide [their] collective action" (O'Donnell 1986, 251) . Whether in its "direct" (e.g. a street protest) or "indirect" form (when individuals claim to speak for a particular group), strong vertical voice rests upon the ability of group members and leaders to reach a consensus about what political interests are pursued in whose name (O'Donnell 1986, 252) . Hence, from this point of view, effective horizontal voice is a prerequisite for social movements' political influence vis-à-vis the state.
The present study argues that the relative weakness of Maya mobilization in Guatemala is due to a weakness of horizontal voice that emanates from both movementinternal and external factors, which distinguish the Guatemalan case from more successful cases of indigenous mobilization in the region. On the one hand, horizontal voice is undermined by the consequences of past and ongoing state violence, the extent of which is unmatched in Latin America. But on the other hand, as this study shows, there are also important movement-internal factors compromising the effectiveness of horizontal voice.
In contrast to the powerful indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador, Maya political mobilization at the national level is characterized by a high degree of organizational sectorization, a lack of elite convergence on key substantive issues, and fundamental disagreements over the choice of political alliances. 7 As a consequence, the collective vertical voice of Guatemala's Maya population -its ability to make political claims as Maya -is weaker than that of the indigenous groups in these other countries.
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Guatemala: From Genocide to Discursive Inclusion
There are about twenty different Maya language groups in Guatemala, whose collective political identity has been fostered by the pan-Mayanist movement that emerged in the 1990s (Fischer and Brown 1996; Warren 1998) , by invoking a common "base Maya culture on a macrocultural level" (Montejo 2005, 17) . Although constituting the demographic majority, they have been politically discriminated against and often violently oppressed by the Guatemalan state throughout the country's history (Adams 2011; Smith 1990b; Taracena et al. 2009 ). Whereas the immediate post-independence years were still dominated by a small white criollo elite -descendants of the Hispanic conquerors -, the so-called Liberal Revolution of 1871 represented the rise of the ladino group, originally the people of mixed European and Amerindian descent, to political power. It was their nation-building project that introduced the sharp ethnic (or racial) dichotomy between a broad category of ladinos -now understood as the non-indigenous Guatemalans -and the indigenous people, which we still find today (Smith 1990a; Taracena et al. 2009 ).
After the overthrow of dictator Jorge Ubico in 1944 and a 10-year "democratic spring", the military coup of 1954 ushered in more than 30 years of increasingly institutionalized military rule, backed by the economic oligarchy. Continuing racial discrimination led to the birth of the Maya movement in the 1970s, as a loose collective of politicointellectual leaders and semi-clandestine organizations (Cojtí 2010, 102; Hale 2006, 62-5, 89-93) . But the mobilization was soon crushed by the military's "scorched earth" violence, during the heights of Guatemala's genocidal 36-year civil war, that systematically targeted the indigenous population, considered to be the rebels' natural support base (Ball, Kobrak, and Spirer 1999, 89-94; Falla 1994; Schirmer 1998) . It was only with the 9 internationally accompanied peace negotiations in the early 1990s that "the Maya could finally participate openly in national politics" (Warren 2004, 149) .
The political opening served as a catalyst for Maya mobilization. Indigenous organizations -some newly created, some emerging from their previously semi-clandestine existence -took advantage of the peace process and became one of the main political forces in the country (Azpuru 1999; Bastos and Camus 2003; Jonas 2000; Warren 1998 ).
This led to the recognition of Guatemala as a multiethnic and multilingual state. Today, the Maya are formally included in political processes, but often not more than rhetorically. Some prominent leaders have been appointed to governmental posts but never of major importance (Warren 2004, 174-5) . During the last legislature, 2008-2011, only 17 out of 158 parliamentarians were of indigenous origin. Hence, present-day Guatemala reflects quite accurately the pattern of Hale's (2004 Hale's ( , 2006 ) "neoliberal multiculturalism", characterized by a rhetorical endorsement of cultural rights and formal equality combined with firm resistance to substantial changes in the distribution of political and economic power (cp. also Bastos and Camus 2003) .
Research Design
The following empirical analysis is based on a 3-months field research in the country conducted from April to July 2011. I carried out 59 semi-structured interviews with leaders of Maya organizations, members of the ladino political elite, and outside experts, using a detailed interview schedule adapted to each target group. For reasons of confidentiality, all interview partners were ensured anonymity.
Consistent with the purpose of this study -analyzing the political influence of civil society organizations in a centralized system -the Maya organizations whose leaders were interviewed are mostly based in the country's capital. 10 The country's state and political elite is represented in this study by top-level bureaucrats, Congressmen, political party leaders, and the directors or chief editors of Guatemala's main traditional media outlets. 11 Interviewees from the state administration were chosen from those areas that were considered key areas of activity by the Maya organizations, according to their own statements (agriculture, education, energy, mining and environment, health, labor). After initial contact with the pertinent institutions, the snowball method was used to identify further relevant interviewees within each area until the interviews did not unveil any new information (cp. Tansey 2007) . This resulted in a sample of 23, mostly top-level, bureaucrats, including five state ministers, who were central actors in both policy design and implementation processes in the relevant areas. In addition, six parliamentarians were interviewed who were also chosen according to their membership in specific congressional committees of interest (agriculture, human rights, indigenous peoples, education, energy and mining, food security).
The small number of interviews in each target group does not allow us to speak of a representative survey. But the non-probability sampling procedures applied here, which targeted the relevant actors involved in the specific processes of interest, should ensure that the gathered information can adequately reproduce these processes (cp. Tansey   2007 ). The interview data was systematically analyzed through conventional content analysis by coding theoretical categories based on the text data (Hsieh and Shannon 2005) , moving from descriptive to interpretive coding and finally identifying the relevant overarching themes in the interviews, as proposed by King and Horrocks (2010, 152-9) .
This information from primary sources was then triangulated with a wide array of secondary literature to arrive at robust and theoretically meaningful conclusions.
Analysis

The Maya Agenda and Organizational Strategies
In order to analyze the internal dynamics of Maya political mobilization in today's Guatemala, we need to identify first the agenda and mobilizational strategies of the or- Outside expert III 2011). It also follows a general regional and global pattern (Healey 2009; Sawyer and Gomez 2012; Wade 2010, 127-8) .
Access to land is still a highly relevant topic for Maya organizations but has undergone a major change of focus: from simple claims for land redistribution to a more ample focus on what is called "integral rural development". The latter refers to demands for an improved infrastructure with respect to health, education, housing, and transport in rural areas, and technical and financial assistance for agricultural production.
Also very important are the struggles for political and cultural rights. Political rights refer to the access of indigenous people to all institutions of state power at the national level (Congress, bureaucracy, judicial system etc. The strategy of popular mobilization described at the beginning -consisting of demonstrations and rallies, the blockade of roads or the occupation of public buildingsis employed in a more selective way, usually when more conventional forms of claimmaking are ignored by the political system. In this sense, popular mobilization -although less widespread -has remained a suitable (and necessary) organizational strategy (cp. 
Movement-internal Barriers to Horizontal Voice
The case of Maya mobilization in Guatemala emphasizes the importance of these movement-internal processes, which O'Donnell (1986) donors that moved into the country during and after the peace negotiations. Donor agencies' approach to democracy promotion and civil society building in developing countries usually favors professionally organized NGOs, associated with specific topics, rather than broader social movements pursuing more general political agendas (Edwards and Hulme 1996; Jad 2007; Petras 1997) . As a result, the latter often become fragmented and depoliticized by the proliferation of externally funded NGOs (Petras 1997 ).
Due to the internationally accompanied peace process, following the devastating civil conflict, the disciplinary influence of this sectoral civil society promotion on indigenous mobilization has been more profound in Guatemala than in other Latin American countries. 13 In the peace negotiations, civil society participation was organized along sectoral lines (Jonas 2000, 37-54; Krznaric 1999) . Also the different comisiones paritarias (joint commissions) of the government and Maya representatives, established in the Indigenous Accord, each dealt with a particular topic, such as, for example, education or land rights (Bastos 2010b, 10-11; Jonas 2000, 158; Krznaric 1999, 7) . Hence, the sectoral approach has become deeply engrained in Maya political organization and claim-making.
Today, the funding that Maya organizations receive from outside is often tied to the execution of specific activities in a specific form defined by the donors ( Prensa Libre (2014) also indicates that the majority of the country's population is opposed to mining activities and that this percentage is higher in rural than in urban areas.
As the previous section showed, at the time of my field research, almost all organizations had at least rhetorically picked up this important concern of the local communities.
However, they had picked it up rather late. As Bastos (2010a, 337-8) 
notes, until recently
Maya national leaders were not much involved in these local struggles against mining as they were focused more on national-level political mobilization. 15 In a sense, this may also reflect the urban bias that some authors have attributed to the pan-Maya movement (see e.g. Brown 1996, 169-70; Carey 2004, 85) . 16 The problem is that the majority of the organizations that are very urban and usually are located in the capital have come up saying "no" to state regulation of the popular referenda. And they come up saying "no" to other proposals, they come up saying "no" to everything. I mean, you will see the same faces everywhere. So what we want as an organization is that there is a regulation -but it should be elaborated by the communities, by new faces, the communal leaders, the local leaders. uadorian Amazon region can be considered pioneers in linking ecological grievances to a discourse of ethnic group survival, the highland groups soon adopted these ecological demands (Becker 2011; Gerlach 2003, 51-75; Lucero 2008) . Hence, although there were also numerous political disagreements and rivalries between the different organizations,
Ecuador's indigenous leaders -in contrast to Maya leaders in Guatemala -have almost always achieved a consensus regarding these key issues (see e.g. Becker 2011, 10, 184-8, 230-2) . This elite convergence facilitates the organization of collective action at both the elite and grassroots levels, which in turn strengthens the movement's vertical voice.
Thirdly, and related to the point before, there are profound disagreements between the different organizations over the choice of political alliances. On the one hand, the traditional leftist wing is naturally closer to leftist political parties. But even within this 
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On the other hand, we find a rather new current that intends to achieve changes not in confrontation to but in alliance with the dominant classes, emphasizing indigenous entrepreneurship and economic development as the remedies against marginalization.
This faction -although not really powerful yet -has obviously more common ground with the political Right. It has also actively sought contact to the institutional representa- That's the perspective of the indigenous people. There is no other.
(Congressman III 2011).
Hence, as a reaction to these experiences, there seems to be something of an emancipation of (at least parts of) the Maya political elite from the Left (Ajxup, Rogers, and Hurtado 2010, 183-4 ). Yet, this also has the effect that in contrast to Ecuador, where the Left constituted the indigenous movement's natural ally (Becker 2011, 10-11, 50) These last two factors -the lack of elite convergence and unclear alliance strategies -are also more acute in Guatemala than in other Latin American countries due to the history of state violence, the lasting effects of which are the focus of the next section.
Violence and the Logic of Divide and Rule: State Strategies to Suppress the Maya Voice
There is widespread fear by the dominant ladino class of a change in the historical racial hierarchy (Hale 2006; Warren 1998, 51, 64-6) . Accordingly, Guatemalan state elites have adopted various strategies to counter Maya empowerment. By rhetorically distinguishing between "good" and "bad", "real" and "false" indigenous representatives, state elites exploit the internal tensions described above to pit different factions against 
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In the most extreme case, this can go as far as denying the authenticity of Guatemala's indigenous people as a whole, as was done by another member of government:
Because now these boys ["chicos"] say that they are Maya descendants.
That is not true. That is absolutely and completely wrong. (…) The Maya lived here ten thousand years ago and disappeared five thousand years ago.
(...) They are mestizos. Mestizos. It's as simple as that. (Minister II 2011) .
Oftentimes, the denunciation of the "bad" leaders is embedded in a discourse of legalism, in which their demands are rejected on the basis of the constitution imposed by the army in 1985. 23 People or organizations questioning the legitimacy of constitutional provisions are quickly denounced as "anarchists", "radicals", "traitors", "terrorists", or "demagogues" who are not able to handle the civil liberties brought about by democracy (Congressman II 2011; Congressman IV 2011; Minister I 2011; Minister II 2011; State official I 2011; State official II 2011; State official III 2011 ).
As mentioned above, these phenomena are not unique to the Guatemalan case. However, here the rhetorical division into "good" and "bad" indigenous leaders has been accompanied by particularly heavy-handed state policies of repression and judicial persecution of the latter category (see e.g. Velásquez Nimatuj 2008, 196-204; Witte 2005) . Importantly, these experiences of present-day repression occur against the background of the genocidal state violence during the civil war which has left the indigenous population deeply divided and atomized, living -as many authors have noted -in a climate of constant fear (Green 2013; Manz 2002; Sanford 2003) . The brutal suppression of the revolutionary movement has also led to a profound pessimism among the Maya as to their abil-23 ity to achieve political change through any type of autonomous collective action (Copeland 2007, 14-7) . Hence, both the deep divisions and this perceived lack of political self-efficacy are a direct consequence of past and present state violence and contribute to the weakness of horizontal voice among Maya organizations in a way that is unique in Latin America.
The logic of divide and rule -the "very core of authoritarian domination" 
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Again, the history of genocidal violence and military-led assistentialist development programs during the civil war provides a particularly fertile ground for paternalist clientelism in today's Guatemala. In Ecuador, for instance, although also playing a role (Becker 2011, 85-96; Lucero 2008, 129, 179, 182; Mijeski and Beck 2011, 92-6) , the effect of clientelism on indigenous mobilization has been less pronounced. 24 In summary, past and ongoing state violence and the clientelistic policies promoted by political parties keep Guatemala's Maya population atomized and divided and, thus, exacerbate the movement-internal contradictions described above.
Conclusions
By challenging state governments through popular mobilization and targeted lobby- Beyond the Guatemalan case, the study confirms the importance of movementinternal processes and strategies of constructing a collective political voice as prerequisites for effective social mobilization besides external opportunity structures. Moreover, instead of merely pointing to the incidence of collective action problems, the study analyzes the precise mechanisms leading to the disarticulation of social mobilization in a particular case. The analysis suggests that the emergence of a vocal social movement very much depends on the ability of group members and leaders to reach a consensus about what political interests are pursued in whose name. Hence, the horizontal voice necessary to achieve this consensus forms the basis of successful political claim-making 26 and, ultimately, of the chances of historically marginalized groups to achieve meaningful political change.
Notes 27
8 See Sieder et al. (2002, 23-4) for a concise analysis of the internal quarrels within COPMAGUA. 9 The reasons for the defeat of the referendum have been analyzed in previous works (see e.g. Carey 2004; Warren 2004) and are not the subject of this study, which focuses on the current situation and the reasons why Maya mobilization has not become a more powerful political force in recent years. Nevertheless, some authors also regard the substantive and strategic disagreements among different Maya organizations and elites as one of the factors contributing to the defeat (Brett 2010, 77; Carey 2004, 74, 80) . In a more general assessment of Maya mobilization, Montejo (2005, 63-5, 72-4, 84) also criticizes the movement's leadership as weak and divided. Hence, the lack of congruence within Maya mobilization efforts that the present study emphasizes is in a certain way perhaps a continuation (or exacerbation) of a previously existing phenomenon. 11 The media sample includes five of the most important national newspapers (Prensa Libre, Nuestro Diario, El Periódico, Siglo 21, and La Hora) , and two national radio stations (Radio Nacional TGW, and Radio Sonora). Additionally, an interview was conducted with the director of TV Maya.
